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“an independent legal duty” which it held to the plaintiff, or where a defendant knowingly
misleads a plaintiff to purchase securities issued by the debtor.5
This memorandum will analyze how these standing principles apply to bankruptcy
proceedings involving complex fraudulent schemes, known as Ponzi schemes.
I.

Courts Will Not Allow Creditors to Artfully Plead Their Way Out of Bankruptcy
Court in an Attempt to Recover Losses Resulting From a Ponzi Scheme.
Courts have repeatedly dismissed claims in which plaintiffs attempt to bring claims

which are related to bankruptcy proceedings outside of bankruptcy courts. These types of claims
are often prevalent in Ponzi schemes, where creditors may be unsatisfied with their share of the
settlement recovered by the trustee of the debtor’s estate.6 Courts have noted that where a claim
could be asserted by a majority of the creditors, it is a general claim that is the exclusive property
of the trustee of the debtor’s estate.7 However, if a plaintiff can show that the injury suffered
was specific to him or her and could not be asserted by the creditor class, the plaintiff has
standing to assert that claim independent of the trustee of the debtor’s estate.8
One specific instance in which the court dealt with this type of specific standing issue
was in Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. v. General Electric Capital Corporation. Ritchie
Capital was litigation that arose as a result of a fraudulent purchase-order financing Ponzi
scheme run by Thomas Petters, beginning in 1998.9 General Electric Capital Corporation
(“GECC”) entered into an agreement with Petters to fund the purchase order business, which
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In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. L.L.C., 740 F.3d 81,
92-93 (2d Cir. 2014).
6
See Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 121 F. Supp. 3d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
7
See In re Cabrini Med. Ctr., 489 B.R. 9, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 884 F.2d at 704.
9
121 F.Supp. 3d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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resulted in $45 million owed to GECC by October 27, 2000.10 In their complaint, Ritchie
Capital Management (“Ritchie”) alleged that in order to repay GECC, Petters induced other
investors to participate in his fraudulent purchase order business, and used the money which he
secured in order to pay the debt owed to GECC.11 The complaint further alleged that Petters
only engaged in these actions after GECC had confronted Petters on suspicion that the
transactions were fraudulent, and in exchange for being repaid in full, GECC remained silent
about their knowledge of Petters scheme.12 Nothing in the complaint alleges any fraudulent
dealings directly between Ritchie and GECC, but rather that GECC’s silence after learning of
Petters’ scheme enabled future creditors to be defrauded, and amounted to aiding and abetting
fraud, as well as civil conspiracy.13
Ritchie did not learn of GECC’s involvement in aiding Petters until 2009, during Petters’
criminal trial, which resulted in his conviction and a sentence of 50 years in prison.14 After
Petters’ conviction, the trustee of Petters’ estate filed suit against GECC in a separate action in
the Bankruptcy Court in the District of Minnesota, seeking to recover $300 million resulting
from 13 counts of fraudulent transfer.15 The claim was settled by the parties for $19 million “in
full, final, and complete settlement of all claims that the debtors, Petters Estates, the Trustee or
the Receiver have released and not reserved in this Agreement.”16 After the District Court
dismissed Ritchie’s claim on the grounds that they did not have standing to assert the claim, and
in the alternative, that they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Ritchie
10

Id. at 327.
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Id. at 333.
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Id. at 329.
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Id. at 330 (quoting No. 08 Bk. 45257 ( D. Minn.), Dkt. 1733 (Order Approving Settlement Agreement, June 28,
2012).
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appealed to the Second Circuit.17 The Second Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Ritchie
lacked standing to bring the claim.18
A.

Ritchie Capital’s Claims Were the Exclusive Property of the Petters Estate,
Therefore Ritchie did not Have Standing to Bring Suit Against GECC.

In appealing the District Court’s dismissal on grounds they did not have standing to bring
the suit, Ritchie advanced two arguments. The first argument asserted was that the claims
Ritchie asserted were in fact particularized to Ritchie, and that the Petters Estate could not bring
them on its own, therefore the claims were not property of the Petters Estate.19 The second
argument Ritchie asserted was that even had Petters brought these claims against GECC, they
would have been barred by in pari delicto, which bars third parties from bringing claims against
“partners in crime.”20 Adopting the District Court’s reasoning, the Second Circuit held that
Ritchie had failed to allege a particularized injury, and therefore did not have standing to pursue
their claim.21
In its standing analysis, the District Court noted previous proceedings, all alleging facts
from Petters’ Ponzi scheme, which were eventually fatal to Ritchie’s claim. Specifically, the
court noted the proceeding involving the settlement between Petters’ Estate and GECC. The
District Court observed that Ritchie’s complaint and the action brought by Petters’ estate shared
six allegations which were at the core of their complaint.22 The Court stated that although the
action brought by the Petters Estate contained different elements than the state law claim brought
by Ritchie, because the action had “the same focus as a fraudulent conveyance action under 11
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Id. at 339.
Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. General Electric Capital Corp., 821 F.3d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 351.
Id.; Ritchie Capital, 121 F.Supp. 3d at 337.
Id.
Ritchie Capital, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 336.

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

U.S.C. § 548(b),” the actions were the property of the estate and only the trustee had standing to
bring them.23 The Court emphasized that this proceeding not only proved that these claims were
the sole property of the Petters Estate to bring against GECC, but that this proceeding showed
that these claims were actually brought and settled between the two parties.24 Further damaging
Ritchie’s argument, the settlement was approved by the bankruptcy court without objection from
Ritchie.25 Because Ritchie had no direct dealings with GECC in the process of being defrauded,
the claims he was alleging against GECC could have been pursued by any creditor who was
defrauded by Petters, leaving the Petters Trustee as the person who had proper standing to
challenge the generalized injuries in court.
B. The Wagoner Rule Does Not Apply in the Case at Hand Because the Petters Estate is
not the Party Bringing the Action
The District Court also rejected Ritchie’s arguments that the Petters Trustee was barred
from bringing these claims against GECC as a result of the Wagoner Rule and the doctrine of in
pari delicto.26 As the Court explained, “[t]he thrust of these doctrines is that a bankrupt
wrongdoer may be barred from pursuing damages claims against its ‘partners in crime’—third
parties who participated in the unlawful conduct.”27 The Court declined to accept Ritchie’s
arguments that these arguments barred the Petters Trustee from bringing these claims for several
reasons. First, the Court had already decided that the claims brought by Ritchie had belonged to
the Petters Estate, and had already been brought before the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Minnesota.28 Second, because in pari delicto is an affirmative defense of common law, it must
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Id. at 337 (citing Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Ruppert Landscaping Co., 187 F.3d 439, 441 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Id.
Id.
Ritchie Capital, 121 F.Supp. 3d at 337.
Id.
Id.
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be actually pled, and cannot apply hypothetically when the suit is brought by a third-party
creditor.29 Similarly, the Court explained that the Wagoner Rule cannot apply when the action is
brought by a third party creditor and not the Trustee of the estate, since the Wagoner Rule is a
federal rule of standing and the Court cannot hypothetically rule on the Trustee’s standing in a
suit brought by a third-party creditor.30
In upholding the district court’s dismissal of Ritchie’s claims, the Second Circuit
reaffirmed a policy of ensuring that plaintiffs are not able to artfully plead their way out of
bankruptcy courts.
II.

Requiring Specific Injury in Order for Creditors to Assert Standing Promotes the
Underlying Purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.
Recognizing that bankruptcy proceedings are typically much more complex than typical

two party litigations, Congress took it upon itself to create the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy
courts. Two of the underlying goals of Congress in enacting the bankruptcy system was to
promote judicial efficiency throughout the court system, as well as to ensure that the process be
as equitable as possible for all creditors involved. The standing requirement imposed on
creditors, requires that they be able to show specific injury, promotes both of those goals.
A.

Making Claims the Exclusive Property of the Debtor’s Estate Ensures Equity
Among all Creditors.

Because of the complex nature of bankruptcy proceedings, especially those involving
Ponzi schemes, it becomes especially crucial for courts to ensure that all of the creditors involved
have an opportunity to recoup at least some of their losses. Thus, by binding creditors to the
results of the litigation brought forth by the trustee of the estate, the bankruptcy proceedings are

29
30

Id. (citing In re Madoff, 848 F. Supp. 2d 469, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id.
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able to eliminate a “race to the courthouse,” which would allow creditors to be paid on a first
come, first served basis.31
The Second Circuit discussed these concerns in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Pepsico, Inc.32 St. Paul rose to the Second Circuit as an appeal of a dismissal of the plaintiff’s
third party complaint at the district court level.33 The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal,
holding that the third-party-complaint was the exclusive property of the estate of the trustee
because it was general in nature and would directly affect all the creditors involved.34 The Court
pointed to the underlying purpose of this standard being included in the Bankruptcy Code,
stating that it “provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue
their own remedies against the debtor’s property. Those who acted first would obtain payment
of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.”35
The Second Circuit’s reasoning in St Paul is a consistent theme which runs throughout
cases in which plaintiffs attempt to recover outside of bankruptcy proceedings.36 Courts have
shown their reluctance to allow these types of claims to be brought outside of the bankruptcy
setting, even when brought against a third party, such as the instances in both St Paul and Ritchie
Capital. By repeatedly affirming this standing principle, courts are ensuring that the bankruptcy
proceeding maintains its status as the proper venue in these types of cases, as well as eliminating
the creditor race to the courthouse that Congress was clearly concerned about.
B. Imposing Stricter Standing Requirements Promotes the Bankruptcy Court’s Goal of
Judicial Efficiency.
31

See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. L.L.C., 429 B.R. 423, 430 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
884 F.2d 688.
33
Id. at 690.
34
Id. at 701.
35
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
5963, 6297).
36
See Ritchie Capital, 121 F.Supp. 3d at 333.
32
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Due to the often extensive number of parties involved in bankruptcy proceedings, courts
maintain a heightened interest in making sure that these proceedings are carried out as efficiently
as possible. This concern becomes especially apparent in cases where plaintiffs attempt to
circumvent the bankruptcy courts in order to obtain their own relief, separate of the creditor
class. In its decision upholding the dismissal of a complaint at the district court level, the Fourth
Circuit explained the importance of judicial efficiency in National American Insurance Co. v.
Ruppert Landscapping Co.37 In maintaining that the plaintiff attempted to plead its way out of
bankruptcy court by bringing claims which belonged to the estate, the Court noted that it is the
trustee’s role to bring these claims.38 By bringing these suits, the trustee “eliminates the many
wasteful and individual suits of individual creditors.”39 The Court noted that it was not just the
individual claims of the parties which were at stake, and to allow plaintiffs to bring these types of
suits “would unravel the bankruptcy process and undermine distribution of the bankruptcy estate.
The goal of bankruptcy is to consolidate the proceedings and avoid piecemeal litigation.”40
Conclusion
The ruling in Ritchie Capital further solidifies the notion that claims which affect an
entire class of creditors are the sole property of the estate of the debtor. If creditors wish to
recover independent of the actions of the trustee, they must be able to show that the injury they
suffered was specific to them, and could not be brought by the trustee or the debtor. Courts have
held that this principle applies even when plaintiffs are attempting to bring suits against third
parties.
37
38
39
40

187 F.3d 439 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 441.
Id. (quoting Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1342-1343 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 442.
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This holding protects many aspects of the bankruptcy process. First, it protects debtors
from being subject to liability from numerous creditors in numerous proceedings. Second, it
protects creditors’ interests by ensuring that an equitable distribution of the available assets will
be achieved, as well as avoiding a race to the courthouse by creditors seeking to be the first to
recover. Finally, it protects the bankruptcy process as a whole by ensuring that bankruptcy
courts retain their authority to issue final rulings, as well as consolidating bankruptcy
proceedings in a single forum.
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